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SOME MORAL CONNECTIONS BETWEEN
ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND ORGAN
DISTRIBUTION
James F. Childress*
Because of major developments in recent years - particularly in immu-
nosuppressive therapies - organ transplantation has entered a new era.
That new era has been marked by increased expectations about the quantity
and quality of life after organ transplantation, and those expectations have
fueled a dramatic increase in the number of transplants, particularly of
hearts and livers. In 1980, there were thirty-six heart and fifteen liver trans-
plants; by 1984 there were 346 heart and 308 liver transplants, and these
numbers doubled again in 1985. Kidney transplants increased from 4,697 in
1980 to 6,968 in 1984 and then to 7,695 in 1985.'
This new era continues to be marked by scarcity - scarcity of organs and
scarcity of funds for transplantation. Several policies have been proposed
and developed to increase the supply of organs, to distribute organs fairly
and equitably, and to provide funds for patients in need of transplants. Ac-
tions have occurred on several levels. The National Organ Transplant Act,'
which was signed into law in October, 1984, addressed several areas, includ-
ing the prohibition of the sale of organs. In addition, it established a Task
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at the Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C., March 20, 1986. It also incorpo-
rates materials that the author prepared for the deliberations and report of the National Task
Force on Organ Transplantation (of which he was a member and vice-chairperson). Fuller
versions of parts of the argument appear in Biolaw (1986) and in a forthcoming volume of Leys
Lectures at Southern Illinois University edited by John Howie. The author is grateful for their
permission to use parts of the argument in modified form here. He retains the copyright to this
version.
1. These statistics were developed by the Office of Organ Transplantation from several
sources. See OFFICE OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION (Feb. 1985). The figures for 1985 were obtained from a telephone
conversation with the Office of Organ Transplantation, 5600 Fishers Lane, Rockville, MD
20857 (Jan. 1986).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274(e) (1984).
86 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 3:85
Force on Organ Transplantation to conduct a comprehensive review of med-
ical, legal, ethical, social and economic issues in transplantation. The Public
Health Service ("PHS") of the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") established an Office of Organ Transplantation. And HHS has an-
nounced funding of some heart and liver transplants. Public Law 99-509,'
approved by Congress and signed by President Reagan in October 1986, au-
thorizes coverage of immunosuppressive medications for outpatients for one
year after the transplant and supports hospital policies of routine inquiry. In
addition to federal action, several states have conducted major studies of
organ transplantation,4 and by October 1986 at least twenty-five states had
mandated policies of routine inquiry in hospitals.5
This article examines some moral connections between policies of organ
procurement and policies of organ distribution. There are important moral
connections between these policies, largely because parts of human beings
are transferred from a cadaver to a patient in need.6 This feature, perhaps
more than any other, has given organ transplantation its prominence in the
media and in the moral imagination, often out of proportion to its overall
importance in health care.
In reflecting on these policies, this article considers ethical acceptability,
ethical preferability and political feasibility. There is, I believe, a wide range
of ethically acceptable policies, at least in principle; which policies should
have priority will depend on considerations of ethical preferability and polit-
ical feasibility. Excluding policies that would seriously violate fundamental
ethical principles, society still has to choose policies that best express the
whole constellation of ethical principles, including ideals, and that can actu-
ally be implemented.
Several ethical principles are relevant to these choices.7 They are sup-
ported by various ethical theories, whether religious or secular, and they are
embedded in many of our practices and policies in organ transplantation, as
well as other areas of health care. However, agreement about the relevance
3. Omnibus Budget Reconcilliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9335, Oct. 21,
1986 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)).
4. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTA-
TION (Oct. 1984) [hereinafter REPORT].
5. AMERICAN COUNCIL ON TRANSPLANTATION, TRANSPLANT ACTION (1986).
6. Living donors supply a large number of the kidneys transplanted in the United States
each year: 1,784 of 6,112 kidney transplants in 1983 and 1,704 of 6,968 in 1984. See TASK
FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: ISSUES AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS (Apr. 1986). See also Childress, The Gift of Life: Ethical Problems and Policies
in Obtaining and Distributing Organs for Transplantation, 2 CRITICAL CARE CLINICS 133-47
(Jan. 1986).
7. For an explication and defense of these principles, see T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHIL-
DRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1983).
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and importance of these ethical principles will not resolve all disputes. In
addition to disputes about their grounds and foundations, that is, why these
principles should be affirmed, there are major disputes about their implica-
tions for particular policies, especially when they appear to come into con-
flict. These ethical principles include, first, respect for persons, including
both their autonomous wishes and their bodies. As will be seen, there may
be debates about whether the wishes of the decedent or of the family should
have priority in cases of conflict. Another principle is benefitting patients
(beneficence), while another is not harming them (nonmaleficence). Because
it may be impossible to produce only benefits and avoid all harms, a princi-
ple of utility or proportionality is necessary; it requires that we produce a net
balance of good effects over bad effects, including harms, burdens, and costs.
However, the mere balance of good and bad effects is not sufficient, for a fair
distribution of benefits and harms, burdens, and costs is required by the prin-
ciple of justice. Other ethical considerations, which may derive from these
principles, are also relevant, including truthfulness, fidelity, privacy and con-
fidentiality. These principles both point directions for policies and set limits
on those policies. For example, in view of the great need for organs to save
and improve the quality of life, it may be tempting to evaluate actual and
proposed policies of organ procurement only according to their effectiveness
and efficiency in obtaining organs. But such an evaluation would be short-
sighted; even though effectiveness and efficiency, as expressions of benefi-
cence and utility, are important, they are not sufficient. Failure to express
these other principles, including respect for persons, would be ethically un-
acceptable, and it would probably also be counterproductive in the long-run.
The moral connections between procurement and distribution emerge from
the special features of organ transplantation in the context of these several
ethical principles.
POLICIES OF ORGAN PROCUREMENT
Approximately 20,000 people die each year under circumstances where
their organs could be salvaged to benefit others.8 The gap between the
number of salvageable organs and the number actually salvaged is much
greater than the number of kidney transplants might suggest. There were
7,695 kidney transplants in 1985, but 1,876 of those kidneys were donated by
living donors, and most cadavers provide two kidneys. Thus, it is necessary
to subtract the number of living donors from the total figure and then divide
the remainder by two. When allowance is made for the wastage of organs
8. Council on Scientific Affairs, Organ Donor Recruitment, 246 J. A.M.A. 2157-58
(1981).
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(perhaps twenty percent in 1985 for an estimate of 1,000) and for the 200-
250 kidneys shipped abroad, it is reasonable to suppose that there were ap-
proximately 3,500 donations of cadaver kidneys in 1985. 9 The active waiting
list for kidney transplants is estimated to be 9,000-10,000, and it is likely that
many more of the approximately 75,000 patients on kidney dialysis would be
good candidates for, and would like to have a kidney transplant if more
kidneys were available.
The legal framework for organ procurement in all fifty states and the
District of Columbia is provided by the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA"), which was rapidly adopted with some modifications in the late
1960's and early 1970's. I° Within this legal framework, individuals may de-
termine what will be done with their organs after their deaths, or, in the
absence of a valid expression of the decedent's wishes, the family may decide
what to do with the organs. In order to eliminate confusion about the dispo-
sition of bodily parts, the UAGA clearly established the decedent's wishes as
determiriative while recognizing a role for familial wishes when the dece-
dent's wishes were not known or validly expressed. Indeed, some ethicists
thought that there was a close moral call between the UAGA and presumed
consent, which had also been proposed, precisely because the UAGA's em-
phasis on the individual's autonomy threatened the tradition of the family's
"quasi-property" right in the corpse."
The "donor card," available in many states with the driver's license, was
envisioned as the main mechanism for the individual to express his wishes.
However, in practice, the decedent's signed donor card plays only a modest
role in organ donation and procurement, and the family of the decedent
plays the major role. Few people sign donor cards; such cards are rarely
available when the decision must be made, and procurement teams generally
will not remove an organ without the family's consent even when there is a
signed donor card. In practice then the family is the major source of author-
ization for the removal of organs.' 2 Furthermore, the term "donor" is am-
biguous because it may refer to (a) the source of the decision to donate, or to
(b) the source of the organs, even if the decedent has not expressed his or her
wishes.
9. See OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, DE-
PARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE ACCESS OF FOREIGN NATIONALS TO
U.S. CADAVER ORGANS (1986).
10. UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT (1968). See Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and
the Law. The Need for Organized Sensitivity, 57 GEO. L.J. 5 (1968-69); see also T.C. GREY,
THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY (1983).
11. P. RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON (1970).
12. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 29.
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There are sound arguments for ensuring that the individual's valid dona-
tion is implemented, regardless of the family's wishes. The principle of re-
spect for persons, or autonomy, backed by the UAGA, supports the view
that persons have the right to dispose of their bodies after their deaths and
that this right is not subject to family veto. 13 Since the UAGA grants agents
who act in good faith immunity from liability for damages in any civil action
and from prosecution in any criminal proceeding, procurement teams appear
to have unreasonable worries about threats of legal action. Nevertheless,
because they depend on the good will of the community, procurement teams
have several reasons for not acting against the family's wishes even when
there is a signed donor card. These reasons include not offending the family
and not jeopardizing the community's good will, which is essential for organ
donations over time. Because of the principle of respect for persons, state
statutes should be modified to provide sanctions against procurement teams
that deliberately fail to implement the decedent's wishes when his organs are
potentially useful. Even though such a modification would ensure respect
for the decedent's wishes in cases where family members are opposed to do-
nation, it would make little difference in the number of organ donations be-
cause few people actually sign donor cards, and, where there is a signed
donor card, the family will usually act on the decedent's expressed wishes.
Educational policies have been largely directed at individuals as potential
signers of donor cards. A Gallup poll taken in 1968, just a few weeks after
the first heart transplant, provided a basis for the belief that donor cards
would be effective: seventy percent of those polled indicated that they would
be willing to donate their organs for transplantation.1 4 However, in 1985
only forty-five percent indicated that they were very or somewhat likely to
donate their organs.' 5 There are several reasons for the reluctance to donate
one's own organs where such donation requires signing a donor card. The
main objection is to putting oneself on record as a potential source of organs.
While respondents gave such reasons as a dislike of "thinking about dying"
and a dislike of "the idea of somebody cutting me up after I die," they most
frequently listed two reasons as "very important": "They might do some-
thing to me before I am really dead" (twenty-three percent); and "I'm afraid
the doctors might hasten my death if they needed my organs" (twenty-one
percent). These reasons reflect the public's distrust of medical institutions
and professionals. Furthermore, the willingness to donate organs is even
13. Peters, Protecting Autonomy in Organ Procurement Procedures.- Some Overlooked Is-
sues, 64 MILBANK Q. 241 (1986).
14. Most in US. Found Willing to Donate Organs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, at 18, col. 4.
15. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, INC., THE U.S. PUBLIC'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ORGAN
TRANSPLANTS/ORGAN DONATION (1985).
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lower among Blacks and other groups who view themselves on the margins
of society and who are even more likely to view its institutions and profes-
sionals as untrustworthy. 6 Several factors could be identified as probable
causes of this distrust, including the same factors that have contributed to
the increasingly adversarial relations between patients and physicians during
the 1970's, as reflected in the tremendous rise in malpractice suits. Because
it stems in part from such broader socio-cultural factors, this attitude of
distrust may not be very amenable to educational efforts.
Perhaps "brain death" is one area where educational efforts could make a
major difference. Yet caution is even required at this point. Long ago Paul
Ramsey argued that it is important, as most recognized, to have a practical
separation between the determination of brain death and determination of
the need for organs by differentiating roles: the physician involved in the
transplant should not determine whether the potential source of the organs
is dead. However, in contrast to many others, Ramsey also insisted on a
differentiation at the intellectual level between updating the criteria for de-
termining death and the need for organs for transplantation. 7 He held that
the criteria for determining death should be updated as a part of the care of
dying patients, not as a way to increase the supply of organs, which propo-
nents of brain death tended to emphasize. 8 It is important to avoid two
concepts of death, one for potential sources of organs and the other for eve-
ryone else.' 9 Even though the concept of death and the criteria for deter-
mining death involve such fundamental socio-cultural perspectives, efforts to
educate the public - and professionals - about brain death may reduce
distrust.
Another possibility is to change the aim of educational programs to in-
crease organ donations. Such programs have usually been directed at indi-
viduals as potential signers of donor cards. However, in view of individuals'
reluctance to put themselves on record as organ donors, based largely on
distrust, it would probably be more effective to target individuals as mem-
bers of family units involved in the process of organ donation. Thus, society
should encourage individuals to discuss their wishes with their family mem-
bers and to donate the organs of a dead or dying relative. Again, the 1985
poll suggests the plausibility of such an approach. In contrast to the forty-
16. Id.; see also Callender, Bayton, Yeager & Clark, Attitudes Among Blacks Toward Do-
nating Kidneys for Transplantation: A Pilot Project, 74 J. NAT'L MED. A. 807-08 (1982).
17. P. RAMSEY, supra note 11.
18. A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 85-88 (1968).
19. Hearings on Organ Transplant: Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight
of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (testimony of A.
Capron).
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five percent who said that they were very or somewhat likely to donate their
own organs, eighty-five percent indicated that they were very or somewhat
likely to donate the organs of a relative, and sixty-five percent indicated that
they were very or somewhat likely to donate the organs of their children. A
cynical reader of this poll could point to the discrepancy between the will-
ingness to donate one's own organs and the willingness to donate the organs
of others, but such an interpretation would miss the point about distrust. In
this context, individuals are in control as family members in deciding to do-
nate the organs of a relative, but they fear that neither they nor their family
would be in control if they signed a donor card. They view the signed donor
card as putting them at the mercy of an untrustworthy system. This inter-
pretation is further supported by the fact that sixty-three percent approved
of the following statement: "Even if I have never given anyone permission, I
wouldn't mind if my organs were donated upon my death." This approval
presupposes, as will be clear later, that family members are making the deci-
sion. Donor cards could remain important, not only for individuals to sign if
they choose, but especially for individuals to use as an occasion for discus-
sion with family members, both to indicate their wishes to their family mem-
bers and to learn about their family members' own wishes. I have argued
that signed donor cards should be respected, but the goal of educational ef-
forts should not be to get individuals to sign donor cards. The goal should
rather be to facilitate communication among family members regarding or-
gan donation.
This educational effort is essential to any program to increase the supply
of organs for transplantation. However, it is not likely to be sufficient be-
cause there are bottlenecks other than individual or familial reluctance to
donate organs. In the absence of explicit authorization from the decedent, it
is often necessary for someone to ask the family members about the dece-
dent's willingness and/or their own willingness to donate the decedent's or-
gans. Faced with a tragic set of circumstances, the family may not initiate a
donation, whether the decedent had expressed his wishes. Hence, as a mode
of respect for the decedent's wishes, which are unlikely to have been ex-
pressed in a donor card, and as a mode of respect for familial wishes, it is
important that the family be asked about organ donation. Such an inquiry
has a twofold object: first, to determine the decedent's wishes and to give the
family an opportunity to act on those wishes, and, second, in the absence of
familial knowledge about the decedent's wishes, to determine the family's
own wishes. In short, such an inquiry is appropriate to inform family mem-
bers about and to effectuate the decedent's and the family's legal rights. It is
also appropriate, if handled properly and sensitively, as an effort to increase
the supply of organs.
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Human generosity, whether expressed by the decedent or by the family,
may not be sufficient to initiate donation in these circumstances. The dece-
dent may have feared the consequences of signing a donor card, while the
family may not think about donation in the face of its tragedy. An affirma-
tive response to an inquiry displays generosity as much as initiation of dona-
tion. Thus, a familial donation may itself respect the decedent's wish to
donate or, in the absence of knowledge of the decedent's wishes, express the
family's own generosity.
A policy of "routine inquiry," "routine notification," or "required re-
quest" - first proposed in 1984 by Arthur Caplan - is currently gaining
momentum, having been voluntarily adopted by several hospitals, having
been passed by at least twenty-five state legislatures, having been supported
by the federal Task Force on Organ Transplantation, and now having been
connected with hospital eligibility for Medicare and Medicaid reimburse-
ment by Public Law 99-509.2o The language of "routine inquiry" is prefera-
ble, because it focuses on the goal of routine inquiry about the decedent's
and/or the family's wishes. However, this goal may best be realized by re-
quiring hospitals to adopt policies of routinely notifying families about the
decedent's rights as well as their own, and of inquiring about the decedent's
and their own wishes. The most defensible legislation does not require the
attending physician or some other identified professionals to undertake the
inquiry; instead, it requires hospitals to adopt a policy of routine inquiry,
allowing them latitude in developing the most appropriate policy for their
own context. Pilot studies indicate that a policy of routine inquiry is both
feasible and effective; 2 ' in addition, it is consistent with the constellation of
values identified earlier.
Proponents of individual autonomy are likely to emphasize another ver-
sion of "routine inquiry" or "required request," one that focuses on the indi-
vidual while alive rather than on the family after his death. Thus, the
individual might be asked to make a decision about whether to donate his
organs, perhaps in the context of obtaining a driver's license or filling out a
state income tax form. Defenders of this version note that families may not
act on the decedent's expressed wishes (expressed in ways other than donor
cards). One problem is how to interpret the widespread failure to sign donor
cards. As I interpreted the evidence above, it seems to reflect less an unwill-
20. Caplan, Organ Procurement: It's Not in the Cards, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9-12
(Oct. 1984).
21. In one major medical center which had averaged six organ donors per year, a policy of
required request increased the number of organ donations to twenty in only nine months. Oh
& Uniewski, Enhancing Organ Recovery by Initiation of Required Request Within a Major
Medical Center, Transplant Proceedings (unpublished law review article).
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ingness to donate than an unwillingness to put oneself on record as an organ
donor out of fear that the record will lead to one's abuse in a situation of
extreme vulnerability. However, it may be appropriate and important to de-
velop a way to record the decedent's wish not to donate as well as his wish to
donate.22 This too is required by the principle of respect for persons, which
allows individuals to thwart as well as to permit donation by others or to
donate organs through their own advance directive.
A policy of required request of individuals that forces individuals to indi-
cate "yes' or "no" would probably reduce rather than increase the supply of
organs for transplantation. In view of the reasons people give for their reluc-
tance to make an advance decision to donate and to record it on donor cards
- in particular their distrust - it is probable that many individuals would
say "no." Their negative decision would preclude familial donation after
their deaths and would reduce the number of organ donations. But, as I
have argued, the current failure to sign a donor card often reflects distrust of
the system of organ procurement rather than a wish not to donate. Two
additional changes would be important in a policy of required request of
individuals. First, individuals should be given several options, such as "yes,"
"no," and "undecided." Second, individuals should be asked if they would
like to designate a decision-maker regarding donation, just as several Natu-
ral Death Acts allow individuals to designate a decision-maker. Such an
approach would be reassuring because the individual could establish a buffer
or barrier between himself and the system of organ procurement, and the
designated decision-maker could presumably reflect the decedent's values in
the situation.
Two other policies have received serious attention, but, even if they are
not ethically unacceptable in the abstract, they are not as ethically preferable
as the policies already discussed and they are not politically feasible. First is
the policy of presumed consent, which has been adopted for corneas in at
least twelve states and for other organs in such countries as Denmark,
France, Israel, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. Having adopted a
policy of "opting out" rather than "opting in," these countries "seem to
come closer to meeting their needs for transplant kidneys" than the United
States.23 But, whatever the differences in legal framework, the actual prac-
tices appear to be much the same.24 For example, although France's policy
22. Peters, supra note 13, at 263-67.
23. Stuart, Veith, & Cranford, Brain Death Laws and Patterns of Consent to Remove Or-
gans for Transplantation from Cadavers in the United States and 28 Other Countries, 31
TRANSPLANTATION 238-44 (1981).
24. Prottas, Organ Procurement in Europe and the United States, 63 MILBANK Q. 94, 108
(1984).
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of presumed consent does not require familial approval or ratification, health
professionals still seek familial consent.2 5 In such a practice, the decedent's
presumed consent may be used as a basis for approaching the family, i.e., for
a ritual of inquiry.
A major reason offered for the ethical preferability of a policy of opting in
is the promotion of altruism. However, a policy of presumed consent builds
on passive altruism - a presumption that a person's failure to dissent from
organ removal constitutes tacit consent to removal - and such a policy does
not preclude active altruism. Furthermore, it does not presuppose that bod-
ily parts belong to the state. The individual and/or family still controls the
disposition of those bodily parts; the only difference is the shift in presump-
tion about the individual's wishes. Even this shift may not be too significant,
for our current practice of familial donation could be construed as (a) based
on the family's presumption of the decedent's consent, or (b) based on the
family's "quasi-property" right in the corpse.
A policy of presumed consent thus shifts the presumption about a person's
wishes apart from his explicit statement of those wishes. Whether it is mor-
ally acceptable in practice depends on the background conditions that deter-
mine the validity of any consent: understanding and voluntariness. For
presumed - or, perhaps better, tacit - consent to be valid, the agent must
understand what is involved, including that a failure to dissent will be con-
strued as consent, and must voluntarily give his tacit consent. Such condi-
tions are morally exacting, and they would require widespread, vigorous
educational efforts.
Finally, whatever might have been the case fifteen or twenty years ago, a
policy of presumed consent does not appear to be politically feasible in the
United States now. The prevalence of distrust prevents such a policy from
being a viable alternative. When the 1985 Gallup poll asked, "Do you feel
that doctors should have the power to remove organs from people who have
died recently but have not signed an organ donor card without consulting
the next of kin," 86.5% said "no." Indeed, instituting a policy of presumed
consent in these circumstances would probably be counterproductive; be-
cause of their distrust many individuals would explicitly dissent.
The second policy - allowing or encouraging the sale of organs - is also
politically infeasible. Public Law 98-507 prohibits the interstate transfer of
organs for valuable consideration, and several states have also prohibited the
sale of organs.26 A market in organs is not politically feasible in part be-
cause of the strong moral opposition to treating human bodies as property
25. Caplan, supra note 20.
26. Note, Regulating the Sale of Human Organs, 71 VA. L. REV. 1015-38 (1985).
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and commodities. On the one hand, it has been claimed that a market could
alleviate the shortage of organs and tissues and thus save lives and improve
their quality. Respondents to this claim note that there are more effective,
safer, and ethically preferable ways to increase the supply of organs. On the
other hand, it has been argued that a market would respect the freedom of
individuals to do what they want to do with their lives as long as they do not
harm others. Respondents to this argument contend that individuals are
being exploited rather than acting freely when they sell bodily parts, and,
often drawing an analogy with prostitution, they insist that a commercial
market is abhorrent to our system of values.2 7
In conclusion, both ethical and political arguments support educational
efforts within the structure of UAGA, but also a redirection of those efforts.
Instead of encouraging individuals to sign donor cards, educational efforts
should encourage them to communicate their wishes to family members and
to ascertain family members' wishes regarding organ donation. An applica-
tion of several ethical principles suggests this redirection along with other
changes, including a policy of routine inquiry aimed at family members in
order to determine the decedent's wishes and/or the family's wishes in the
absence of knowledge of the decedent's wishes.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF DONATED ORGANS
Who controls the distribution of donated organs and by what standards
should donated organs be distributed? Living donors may, of course, desig-
nate the recipient of a kidney, and they usually give to a family member.
Recently there has been some debate about whether any living donors
should be used, and especially about whether living, genetically unrelated
donors, such as spouses or friends, should be accepted.2" In an effort to
increase organ donations, the President and other public officials, as well as
the media, have made specific, ad hoc appeals on behalf of particular needy
recipients, usually a child. Questions have been raised about the morality of
such appeals, in part because of inequality of access to public officials and
the media. In response, it has been argued that such appeals increase the
overall supply of organs and thus redound to the benefit of all recipients.
When cadaver organs have been donated for an identified recipient, they
27. National Organ Transplant Act: Hearings on H.R. 4080 Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
125, 128 (1984) (testimony of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.).
28. Starzl, Will Live Organ Donations No Longer Be Justified?, 15 HASTINGS CENTER
REP. 5 (Apr. 1985). Contra Levey, Hou & Bush, Jr., Kidney Transplantation from Unrelated
Living Donors: Time to Reclaim a Discarded Opportunity, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 914-16
(1986).
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have sometimes been inappropriate for that recipient and, with the family's
permission, have been used for other needy persons.
It is difficult to criticize the parents who donated their son's heart to his
sick girlfriend after his sudden, unexpected death, because he had indicated
that she should receive his heart if he should die. Nevertheless, the morality
of accepting designated organs has been debated. Here again there may be a
tension among the principles of respect for persons, beneficence-especially
utility-and justice. The most effective and efficient way to design and im-
plement a system of organ procurement is to engender altruism toward un-
identified strangers, even if the system needs an occasional stimulus by
appeals for identified recipients. However, even in such a system, the ques-
tion will arise about whether to accept an organ that has been donated for a
particular recipient or group of recipients by the decedent and/or the family.
Most donor restrictions specify a group or groups which should receive or
should be denied the gift. For example, donors may request that the organ
be used or not be used for members of certain racial, religious, or other
groups. According to the UAGA's list of people who may become donees, it
is possible to designate "any specified individual for therapy or transplanta-
tion needed by him," as well as various professionals and institutions.29 On
the one hand, there may be good reasons to respect the donor's wishes and to
avoid wasting the gift. On the other hand, there may be good reasons for
physicians and other professionals to refuse to be instruments of donor's
wishes when those wishes are contrary to medical judgment and standards of
justice affirmed by the system of procurement and distribution, such as
avoidance of racial discrimination. However, the legal situation is not to-
tally clear.
Most donations of organs are made without specification of the recipient,
and the organ procurement team controls the distribution of such organs.
As the donee under the UAGA, the organ procurement team may accept or
reject the gift. But there may be debate about the organ procurement team's
legal responsibility under such circumstances. For example, would the team
be subject to legal liability for failing to accept the gift if it became known
that another patient's life could probably have been extended or quality of
life improved with that organ? There may also be uncertainty about the
legal responsibility of the procurement team for the use of an organ that has
been donated without restriction, as long as it is not transferred for "valua-
ble consideration" in violation of federal and state statutes that prohibit the
sale of organs.
Whatever the legal picture, it can be argued morally that donated organs
29. See sources cited supra note 10.
Organ Procurement
belong to the community. This fundamental conviction undergirded the
Task Force's deliberations and recommendations regarding equitable access
to organ transplantation in response to its mandate in the National Organ
Transplant Act to make "recommendations for assuring equitable access by
patients to organ transplantation and for assuring the equitable allocation of
donated organs among transplant centers and among patients medically
qualified for an organ transplant." 3° According to the Task Force, donated
organs should be viewed as scarce public resources to be used for the welfare
of the community.31 Within this conception, organ procurement and trans-
plant teams receive donated organs as trustees and stewards for the commu-
nity, and they should determine who will receive available organs according
to public criteria that have been developed with public input and reflect prin-
ciples of justice as well as medical standards. In general, the evidence re-
ceived by the Task Force indicates that organ procurement and transplant
teams make responsible decisions. However, because of some widely publi-
cized exceptions, particularly involving nonimmigrant aliens, there is in-
creasing demand that the public participate in formulating the criteria for
patient selection in order to ensure that they are fair. This demand stems
from the nature of the organ procurement system, which depends on volun-
tary gifts to strangers.
Policies of organ procurement and distribution interact. The success of
policies of organ procurement may reduce scarcity and some of the difficul-
ties of patient selection. But the scarcity of organs for transplantation will
probably remain a problem for the indefinite future, and the demand may
always exceed the supply. Under these circumstances, difficult questions
will remain about the process and criteria of patient selection. If policies of
distribution are perceived by the public to be unfair, then it is likely that
public distrust - already a major factor in the reluctance to donate organs
- may reduce the effectiveness of policies of organ procurement. While
strongly recommending some criteria and rejecting other criteria such as
bribery, favoritism, sex and race discrimination, the Task Force concluded
that several disputed criteria should be subject to ongoing public debate, and
that the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network should involve
significant public representation, particularly participation in the examina-
tion of current and proposed criteria for patient selection. Just procedures
for developing and applying criteria for patient selection are important for
maintaining the trust essential to successful organ procurement.
Most conceptions of justice permit rationing or triage under conditions of
30. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (note).
31. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6.
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scarcity, but they rule out selection criteria that reflect morally irrelevant
characteristics, such as race or sex. Thus the major debates focus on which
characteristics are morally relevant and which are morally irrelevant in the
two stages of selecting patients for organ transplants - formation of an ac-
tive waiting list for transplantation, and distribution of donated organs.
There is general agreement that at both stages the primary criteria should be
medical: medical need and probability of success. However, there is debate
about whether these medical criteria should be defined broadly or narrowly,
about how to specify them, about the relevance of such factors as age, and
about whether need or probability of success should have priority in cases of
conflict.
Both medical need and probability of success reflect medical utility, which
requires the maximization of the welfare of patients suffering from end-stage
organ failure. Medical utility should be distinguished from social utility.
While social utility might include the value of salvageable patients to society,
medical utility requires that organs be used as effectively and as efficiently as
possible to benefit as many patients as possible. For example, if there is no
reasonable chance that an organ will benefit a particular patient, it would be
unethical stewardship of the donated organ to implant it in that patient. If
donated organs are viewed as scarce community resources, it might appear
that social utility rather than medical utility should be adopted by trustees of
donated organs. In such a setting, some would argue, it is appropriate to
consider "the likely pattern of future services to be rendered by the patient
(adequate recovery assumed)."32 Proponents of social utility do not deny
medical utility, but they want to add social utility whenever possible. How-
ever, in addition to the difficulty of formulating and adopting standards of
social utility, there are strong arguments for viewing the distribution of med-
ical care and especially organs as exempt from this broader version of social
utility.33 In particular, the policies of procurement described and proposed
earlier would be unfair and also ineffective if organs were distributed on the
basis of social utility as well as medical utility.
Because judgments about medical need and probability of success are
value-laden, they will need constant medical and public scrutiny. For in-
stance, there is debate about what will count as success - e.g., length of
graft survival, length of patient survival, quality of life, and rehabilitation -
and about the factors that influence the probability of success. Some contra-
indications are well established, such as mismatched blood group or positive
32. Rescher, The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy, 79 ETHICS 173-86
(1969). For the distinction between medical utility and social utility, see Childress, Triage in
Neonatal Intensive Care. The Limitations of a Metaphor, 69 VA. L. REV. 547-61 (1983).
33. See T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHILDRESS, supra note 7, at 209-17.
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donor-recipient cross-match. On the basis of current evidence, the Task
Force held that, according to both medical utility and justice, a recipient
with a perfect match or zero antigen mismatch for Human Leukocyte Anti-
gen ("HLA") A, B, and DR antigens should be offered that organ first and
that 0 blood-group organs should always be offered first to suitable "0"
recipients. (Since 0 blood-group organs can be used for patients with all
blood types, but not vice versa, "A" patients have received transplants
sooner, and "0" patients have spent more time on the waiting list.)34 Apart
from these special circumstances, there are other difficult questions about
mandated organ sharing that will be addressed below.
Not only do values enter judgments about medical need and probability of
success, but they also affect judgments about priority in cases of conflict.
For example, sometimes there is a tension between urgency of need and
probability of success. The patient with urgent medical need may not be
able to survive until another organ becomes available, but that patient's
overall condition may greatly reduce the probability of a successful trans-
plant and thus increase the chances that the organ will be "wasted." The
Task Force notes:
A decision on how to apply the criterion of urgency must be devel-
oped by a thoughtful and broadly representative group, which
must struggle with the concept of [the] best use of organs in the
context of compassion and humanitarianism. Because donated or-
gans are a scarce resource, policies to resolve conflicts between eq-
uity and efficiency that arise in the distribution of organs should be
determined by a broadly representative group that includes patient,
community, and ethical perspectives, as well as those of the medi-
cal professionals involved.35
In addition, it is important to make sure that the category of urgent medical
need or emergency is strictly applied so that some patients do not gain unfair
advantage over others by an inappropriate use of this classification. It can
also be argued that medical urgency should include not only the immediate
threat of death but also the likelihood of not receiving another organ because
of presensitization. However, even though sensitized patients now form the
hard core of the waiting lists for kidney transplants and wait longer for
transplants, their success rates are also lower than those of unsensitized pa-
tients. Again, there may be a tension between medical need and pro-
bability of success.
Medical need and probability of success, however defined and however
ranked, are not always sufficient to determine who should receive particular
34. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 74.
35. Id. at 88-89.
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donated organs. If, according to these medical criteria based on medical
utility, two or more patients are equally good candidates for an organ, then
the fairest way to make the final selection is to consider their time on the
waiting list. There are two different approaches to the use of this criterion.
The Massachusetts Task Force recommended its use after determining the
waiting list and prior to determining the medical need and probability of
success. Thus, according to this approach, the "highest ranking candidate
[rank is determined by time on the waiting list] who 'matches' [the] first
available donor organ gets it, unless [the] lower ranking candidate is in im-
mediate danger of death and [the] first candidate has a reasonable chance of
surviving to receive the next available donor organ." Breaking the queue in
such cases "must be approved by a system-wide selection committee with
public representation."36 According to the federal Task Force, time on the
waiting list should be invoked only if medical need and probability of success
are roughly equal.37 In part, the question concerns the moral weight of
queuing in relation to efficiency in the use of organs. The federal Task Force
put primary weight on medical utility, including both medical need and
probability of success, and held that probability of success as determined in
part by a good HLA match should be considered prior to time on the wait-
ing list. Nevertheless, the criterion of time on the waiting list will be used
frequently, because many organs will need to be allocated by criteria other
than HLA match and sensitization; this criterion will often give priority to
highly sensitized patients over nonsensitized patients who are equivalent
matches for particular organs because the highly sensitized patients are
likely to have spent more time waiting for an organ.
Several other criteria have been proposed or adopted, and it is important
to examine them carefully in order to make sure that they reflect medical
utility rather than social utility and that they are not otherwise unfair. For
example, former Health and Human Services ("HHS") Secretary Patricia
Harris withdrew the earlier tentative authorization for Medicare to cover
some heart transplants in part because of her concern that some criteria of
patient selection were more social than medical.3" Among the other criteria
that require constant examination by the Organ Procurement and Trans-
plantation Network, and other publicly accountable bodies, are age, life-
styles, social network of support, number of previous transplantations,
geography, and ability to pay. The first three - age, lifestyles, and social
network of support - are especially complicated because they may reflect
36. REPORT, supra note 4.
37. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 89.
38. Knox, Heart Transplants: To Pay or Not to Pay, 209 SCIENCE 570-75 (1980). See also
T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHILDRESS, supra note 7, at 325-26.
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either judgments about medical acceptability and priority, particularly the
probability of success, or judgments about social acceptability and priority,
particularly the value of some people and the disvalue of others to the soci-
ety. A publicly accountable body should examine such criteria very care-
fully in order to ensure that they are really medically relevant and, if they
are medically relevant, that they are properly applied. For example, age
may be a rough indicator of the probability of survival of a major operation
and may thus be medically relevant, and the probability of success may also
focus on the length of time that the recipient of an organ may be expected to
survive. However, since the major medical concern is physiological age
rather than chronological age, each case must be assessed individually.
Lifestyle is another controversial criterion in patient selection. It has been
argued that it is not unjust to assign low priority to transplant candidates
whose lifestyles, in contrast to the natural or social lottery, contributed sig-
nificantly to their end-stage organ failure. An example is end-stage liver fail-
ure as a result of alcohol and drug abuse. Even if it is not unjust to consider
such factors in ranking potential recipients, it would be difficult both morally
and politically to apply such a criterion, especially because of social compas-
sion for patients in need, regardless of the origin of that need, and because of
uncertainty about the connection between many lifestyles and diseases and
about the voluntariness of the individual's choice of a risky lifestyle. Never-
theless, lifestyle itself may be medically relevant in predicting the probability
of a successful transplantation, if success includes more than graft survival
for a short period. For example, a patient's continued heavy use of alcohol
and drugs may greatly reduce the probability that a transplant will be suc-
cessful, and neither medical utility nor justice requires that this patient re-
ceive a particular organ under conditions of scarcity.
A social network of support was used as a criterion by the Stanford heart
transplant program, and it was also invoked in the initial decision to deny
Baby Jesse a heart transplant at Loma Linda University.39 If the probability
of a successful outcome includes more than graft survival for a short period,
then such a social network of support may be important in the overall suc-
cess of the transplant and thus in the effective and efficient use of the
donated organ. But, as the Massachusetts Task Force on Organ Transplan-
tation insisted, "the absence of a family or the existence of an unconven-
tional substitute should not serve as a reason to exclude the patient from
evaluation." Instead, "society should develop mechanisms, in cooperation
with the transplanting hospitals, to provide sufficient support resources for
such patients during their recuperation" and should include the costs of after
39. T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHILDRESS, supra note 7, at 325-26.
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care in the analysis of the cost of the transplantation itself.4 ° Here again
medical utility and social utility must be sharply distinguished from and con-
strained by justice.
Similar tensions emerge when we consider how many transplants any pa-
tient should be eligible to receive, particularly in view of the scarcity of or-
gans. Between 1977 and 1981, forty-two patients received three or more
kidney transplants, 713 received two transplants, and 10,063 received one
transplant. 4 The fundamental question is whether equitable access should
limit a patient to one transplant; if it does, then physicians and patients
might hold out for the best possible chance, considering, for example, the
quality of the organ as well as the closeness of the match. In addition, sensi-
tization as a result of previous transplants may reduce the chances of a suc-
cessful transplant. Even though it is not clear that limiting a patient to one
transplant would constitute abandonment, judgments may differ according
to whether there are back-up or alternative treatments, such as dialysis.
To what extent should "accidents of geography" be relevant in selection of
patients to receive scarce organs? In 1984, approximately forty percent of
the donated cadaver kidneys and many of the hearts and livers were trans-
planted outside the geographical areas where they were retrieved.42 I have
already dealt with the question of donors' expressed restrictions, which may
include geography. Now the question is whether "accidents of geography"
should be otherwise relevant in distributing organs, particularly in view of
the conviction, expressed by the Task Force, that donated organs are scarce
public resources. Some argue that because donated organs are public re-
sources and belong to the community, "in principle, and to the extent tech-
nically and practically achievable, any citizen or resident of the United
States in need of a transplant should be considered as a potential recipient of
each retrieved organ on a basis equal to that of a patient who lives in the area
where the organs or tissues are retrieved.",43 In addition to practical and
technical limits, several ethical considerations may be relevant.
Technical limits involve possible damage to organs by transportation and
delay in transplantation. And since cyclosporine is nephrotoxic, there may
be additional reasons to use kidneys as quickly as possible, and much earlier
than the seventy-two hours that many consider a maximum limit outside the
body. Transportation is often less feasible for hearts, which should be used
within eight hours after removal from the cadaver, and livers, which should
be used within six hours. Thus, medical utility, particularly the probability
40. REPORT, supra note 4.
41. OFFICE OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 1.
42. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 65.
43. Id. at 92 (testimony of the Council of the Society of Transplant Physicians).
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of success and avoidance of wastage, may assign priority to local or regional
recipients under some conditions. There are also disputes about the impor-
tance of HLA matching (apart from perfect matches or zero antigen mis-
matches) to increase the chances of success when cyclosporine is used.
Practical considerations include the additional incentive that local use
provides to professionals involved in procurement. In addition, local use
provides an occasion for public education and may increase the public's will-
ingness to donate. Nevertheless, these practical considerations should be re-
duced considerably, if not totally eliminated, in a network that distributes
according to objective medical criteria and time on the waiting list. Such a
network, a single national system of organ procurement and distribution
that is being developed under contract by United Network for Organ Shar-
ing in Richmond, Virginia, should have a major impact on these practical
considerations by ensuring equity in distribution. Such a network should
offer all the advantages of reciprocity in giving and receiving. However, un-
til other criteria are developed with public participation, the Task Force rec-
ommended a policy of mandatory sharing by centers only under the
conditions identified earlier: a perfect donor-recipient match of HLA A, B,
and DR antigens or zero antigen mismatch (if at least one antigen has been
identified at each locus for both donor and recipient), priority to highly sen-
sitized patients, and the use of 0 blood-group organs only in 0 blood-group
recipients.
Considerations of equity are also relevant. Dr. Olga Jonasson has argued
that mandated sharing on the basis of HLA match (apart from the perfect
match or zero antigen mismatch) could actually be unfair to Blacks and
Hispanics. Most organ donors are White (for reasons that were suggested
earlier), certain HLA phenotypes are different in White, Black, and Hispanic
populations, and the identification of HLA phenotypes is less complete for
Blacks and Hispanics; thus, mandated sharing of retrieved organs according
to HLA typing could reduce the access of Blacks and Hispanics to kidneys,
even though they have a much higher rate of end-stage renal disease than
Whites (perhaps four to five times the rate of Whites)."
So far in discussing the moral relevance of "accidents of geography" I
have focused on distribution of organs within the United States without re-
gard to the national origin of the recipients. However in 1985, of the ca-
daver kidneys retrieved in the United States, approximately 300 were
transplanted into nonimmigrant aliens who had come to the United States
for medical care and 200-250 were shipped abroad for use in other coun-
44. See id. at 92.
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tries.4" Stories in the Pittsburgh Press indicated that nonresident, nonimmi-
grant aliens sometimes receive priority over citizens of the United States for
scarce organs retrieved in the United States.46 Hence, the question emerged
about whether construing donated organs as a public or community resource
meant viewing them as a scarce national resource or as a scarce international
resource. The term "national" has been invoked to limit local and regional
claims on organs, but it has also been invoked to limit international claims
on those organs. Here again there is a connection between procurement and
distribution. If the system of organ procurement is viewed as a voluntary,
cooperative system, involving gifts of organs, it may be appropriate to assign
priority to citizens of the United States, but it may also be appropriate and
perhaps even commendable, even if not obligatory, to share some organs
with people outside the national boundaries.
There are several possible policies regarding nonimmigrant aliens: (1) al-
low some nonimmigrant aliens on waiting lists and give them priority;
(2) exclude them from receiving any cadaver organs obtained in the United
States; (3) include some on waiting lists after informing them that they will
not receive an organ until it has been determined that no United States citi-
zen (or alien residing in the United States) could benefit from that organ;
(4) accept a maximum number (such as five to ten percent) of nonimmigrant
aliens on waiting lists and then treat them equally by using the same criteria
of distribution for all people on the waiting lists; and (5) accept nonimmi-
grant aliens on waiting lists as candidates for organs without any numerical
restrictions or priority to United States citizens.
There is some evidence that the first policy has sometimes been adopted
by some centers. For example, two cadaver kidneys became available on
May 4, 1985, as the result of the death of a fifteen year old North Carolina
youth. The waiting list at Presbyterian Hospital in Pittsburgh included a
sixty year old woman, who was a United States citizen, who had been on the
list for three years, who had almost exhausted her bodily sites for hook-up to
dialysis machines, and whose organ-rejecting antibodies were at a lower level
than usual and within acceptable limits for transplantation; an Egyptian
physician's eleven year old son who had not yet been put on dialysis; and a
Saudi Arabian who had only been in the United States seven weeks waiting
45. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, supra note 9.
46. Schneider & Flaherty, Favoritism Shrouds Presby Transplants, The Pittsburgh Press,
May 12, 1985, at 1, col. 1; Twedt, U.S. Panel to Study Transplant Rules, Pittsburgh Press, May
13, 1985, at 1, col. 5; see also Gordon, Quota System Would Limit Non-Resident Transplants,
Pittsburgh Press, May 14, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
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for a transplant. The kidneys were used for the last two candidates.47 In
part, the debate about such cases has focused on the relevance of a person's
ability to pay more than the federal government pays through the End-Stage
Renal Disease Program ("ESRD"). If a nonimmigrant alien receives prior-
ity because of his ability to pay more than the going rate, or even to make a
substantial contribution to the institution, then the institution is selling or-
gans that have been donated to the community. The arguments against such
a practice have been identified earlier. Assignment of priority according to
wealth or favoritism is unjust and it threatens the voluntary cooperation of
various donors who already doubt the system's trustworthiness. One major
problem is that foreign nationals, on the average, are transplanted more
quickly than United States residents, largely because fewer of them are
highly sensitized. The serious threat to the system of organ procurement
and donation has been emphasized in a 1986 report on The Access of For-
eign Nationals to U.S. Cadaver Organs which indicated that:
Organ donation in the U.S. rests on a fragile foundation. People
donate organs with the assumption that the system for distributing
them will be a fair one. When they learn that foreign nationals
receive organs instead of U.S. residents and that they generally do
so in a shorter period of time, they begin to question the fairness of
that system and may very well become less inclined to donate. In-
deed, in some communities where there has been much publicity
about foreign nationals receiving transplanted kidneys, there has
been a subsequent reduction in donation levels.48
The second policy - excluding nonimmigrant aliens altogether - has
been opposed as uncompassionate and unfair, particularly because so many
organs are wasted. However, it is possible that wastage could be reduced by
increasing the number of United States citizens on waiting lists for kidney
transplantation, since only 9,000-10,000 of the approximately 75,000 pa-
tients on dialysis are also on active waiting lists for transplantation. Total
exclusion has also been opposed as chauvinistic and near-sighted because it
neglects the international good will that American transplant programs can
generate, especially if they combine transplantation of some foreign nation-
als with efforts to develop transplant programs in those countries. In addi-
tion, it is probable that United States citizens do not oppose transplanting
some nonimmigrant aliens but only oppose giving them priority on morally
irrelevant grounds.
Humanitarianism is frequently offered as a reason for rejecting the second
47. Schneider & Flaherty, Woman Passed Over After 3-Year Wait, Pittsburgh Press, May
12, 1985, at A10, col. 2.
48. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, supra note 9.
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policy, particularly because medical humanitarianism does not recognize
such criteria as sex, race, and nationality. However, in reality, even medical
humanitarianism recognizes some limits and priorities when not everyone
can be treated, and, in any event, the distribution of organs is not merely a
matter of medical humanitarianism. Donated organs are not the property of
medical professionals but of the community, and medical professionals hold
them only as trustees and stewards for that community. Then the debate is
whether the national community has an obligation to share its organs with
citizens of other countries. Obviously there are strong moral obligations to
share with other countries that participate in a system marked by reciproc-
ity, and, even where there are no strict moral obligations of justice, it may be
compassionate and generous for the national community to share, as long as
the sacrifices are not excessive for its own citizens. But when it is impossible
to meet the needs of everyone, it may be permissible to give priority to near
neighbors (citizens) over distant neighbors.
An argument to share organs based on a duty of beneficence, not on a
duty of justice or on the ideal of generosity, would also have to recognize the
limits that usually mark duties of beneficence. An agent, whether an indi-
vidual or a group, may be obligated to share except where that sharing
would result in excessive harms, costs, or burdens to the agent.49 Using
cadaver kidneys for foreign nationals reduces the number of kidneys avail-
able for United States residents and increases their average waiting time; in
addition it costs Medicare, because for each kidney transplant performed on
a Medicare beneficiary in 1985 the Medicare system saved an average of
$62,000 over a five-year period. If 275 of the estimated 300 cadaver kidneys
that went to foreign nationals in 1985 had gone to Medicare recipients, the
system would have saved approximately $17 million over a five-year pe-
riod. so These arguments for some limits count against the fifth position that
would accept nonimmigrant aliens without any numerical restrictions or pri-
ority for United States citizens.
Both the third and fourth positions accept some sharing for various moral
and nonmoral reasons, but disagree about how organs should be distributed
to nonimmigrant aliens or shipped abroad. The third position can be char-
acterized as "Americans first," and it would assign priority to United States
residents, while accepting some nonimmigrant aliens at the bottom of the
waiting list or on a separate, but unequal, waiting list. The major objection
is that nonimmigrant aliens are then treated as second-class patients with
little realistic chance of obtaining organs. Even if nonimmigrant aliens vol-
49. T.L. BEAUCHAMP & J.F. CHILDRESS, supra note 7, at 148-49.
50. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, supra note 9, at 10.
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untarily accept their place on the waiting list in order to have a slight chance
of a transplant, it is possible to argue that they are being exploited in order
to avoid wastage of retrieved organs.
The fourth position would attempt to avoid such inequities by setting a
limit on the number of nonimmigrant aliens on waiting lists but then grant-
ing those on waiting lists access to donated organs according to the same
criteria as United States residents: medical need, probability of success, and
time on waiting lists. Whether sharing is an ideal or a duty, some limits are
reasonable from both moral and political standpoints. Such a policy would
probably be politically feasible, because public protest appears to have been
directed against giving priority to, not against any sharing with, nonimmi-
grant aliens. However, proponents of the third position contend that any
numerical limit is arbitrary and that this policy is still unfair to U.S. citizens
who should have priority over nonimmigrant aliens in the competition for
scarce organs.
The fifth policy - acceptance of nonimmigrant aliens without any numer-
ical restrictions or priorities for United States citizens - is difficult to defend
in view of the shortage of organs for United States citizens who support a
system of kidney retrieval and of maintenance of patients on kidney dialysis
and transplantation through their tax dollars and who participate in the vol-
untary, cooperative system of donation. (Also see the arguments discussed
under the second policy.)
The compromise adopted by the Task Force on Organ Transplantation
endorsed the fourth position for renal organs, setting a maximum number of
ten percent from any one center until reviewed by the Organ Procurement
and Transplantation Network, and the third position for extrarenal or-
gans.5 ' The fourth position, which evoked a. vigorous dissent from eight
members of the twenty-five member Task Force, was accepted for kidney
transplants because kidneys are not as scarce as extrarenal organs and be-
cause dialysis is usually available as a backup or an alternative. However,
the dissent focused on the unfairness of denying members of this donating
community, including aliens living in the United States as well as American
citizens, access to donated organs, and of taxpayers' money covering the
costs of kidney procurement.52 In addition, critics of the majority position
emphasize that setting a limit of ten percent could actually have the unin-
tended effect of "legitimizing a higher incidence of transplants for foreign
nationals at centers now functioning well below the ten percent level." 5 3
51. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 93-95.
52. Id. at 137-38.
53. OFFICE OF ANALYSIS AND INSPECTIONS, supra note 9, at ii.
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The Task Force recommended the fourth position for the disposition of
cadaver kidneys "until the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Net-
work has had an opportunity to review the issue."5 4 If the premise is ac-
cepted that some sharing is defensible, even if not obligatory, it will be
necessary to explore further the ethical questions raised by "accidents of ge-
ography," particularly national residence, in the context of the close moral
connections between organ procurement and distribution. Public input is
indispensable on grounds of fairness; it is only fair for the public to partici-
pate in the development of criteria of patient selection for scarce organs
donated to the community and held by professionals as trustees. Public con-
fidence that the criteria of distribution are morally acceptable and fairly ap-
plied is important for the maintenance of the trust that is essential to organ
donation.
PROVISION OF FUNDS FOR TRANSPLANTATION
Ability to pay has played a major role in organ transplantation, especially,
but not limited to, heart and liver transplantation. Even if it is unfair for
procurement teams to sell organs to the highest bidder, to the patient who
can pay more than the going rate, there may still be debate about whether it
is unfair to select the recipient who can pay the going rate. The Task Force
on Organ Transplantation firmly rejected the criterion of ability to pay as
unjust, in part because of the moral connections between practices of organ
procurement and practices of organ distribution.
Renal dialysis and transplantation have been covered by the End Stage
Renal Disease program of Medicare since the early 1970's, and, even though
the costs of the program are tremendous - over three billion dollars each
year for approximately 75,000 patients - patients who need dialysis are able
to receive it, and priority is no longer given, as it was earlier, to white, col-
lege-educated males.55 More equal access has resulted from this program, at
least for patients needing dialysis and probably also for patients needing (and
wanting) kidney transplants. Nevertheless, access to kidney transplantation
has sometimes been limited by a lack of information and referral and, more
recently, by a lack of funds for expensive immunosuppresssive therapies,
particularly cyclosporine, which costs approximately $6,000 a year for kid-
ney transplant recipients. Thus, the Task Force recommended the establish-
ment of a Joint HCFA-PHS program "to provide immunosuppressive
medications to transplant centers for distribution to financially needy Medi-
54. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 95.
55. Evans, Blagg & Bryan, Jr., Implications for Health Policy: A Social and Demographic
Profile of Hemodialysis Patients in the United States, 245 J. A.M.A. 478-91 (1981).
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care eligible transplant patients."5 6 Its aim was to reduce the inequities
based on inability to pay for immunosuppressive medications that had
emerged in a program designed to eliminate the criterion of ability to pay in
the distribution of kidney dialysis and transplantation. (Public Law 99-509,
approved by the U.S. Congress and signed into law by President Reagan in
October 1986 with an effective date of January 1, 1987, will provide coverage
of immunosuppressive medications for one year following each procedure
for Medicare-covered transplant recipients.)57
Even if consistency supports a federal governmental role, at least as a last
resort, in the provision of funds for immunosuppressive medications for
transplants that are covered by Medicare, it does not have the same weight
in arguments for a federal role in the provision of funds for organ transplants
that are not currently covered. Nevertheless, there are several strong argu-
ments for a societal obligation to provide funds for expensive - heart trans-
plants average $95,000 (range: $57,000-110,000) and liver transplants
average $130,000 (range: $68,000-238,000)" s - but effective extrarenal
transplants. In the current situation, only a few heart transplants and some
liver transplants for children are now eligible for coverage by the Health
Care Financing Administration, along with cornea transplants and some
bone marrow transplants. While approximately eighty percent of the com-
mercial insurers and Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans now cover both heart
and liver transplants, many people - perhaps twenty-five to thirty-five mil-
lion - have no insurance, and many of them could not qualify for Medicaid
programs, many of which do not cover heart and liver transplants.5 9
The first argument builds on society's obligation to meet the basic needs of
its members. This obligation has already been recognized in several prece-
dent-setting governmental programs, including the ESRD program for dial-
ysis and kidney transplantation. According to the President's Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behav-
ioral Research, the standard of "equitable access to health care requires that
all citizens be able to secure an adequate level of health care without exces-
sive burdens. ' 6O Of course, there is widespread debate about what consti-
tutes an "adequate level of health care" and "excessive burdens," but the
56. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY AND THE
CONGRESS ON IMMUNOSUPPRESSIVE THERAPIES (1985).
57. Omnibus Budget Reconcilliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9335, Oct. 21,
1986 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s)(2)).
58. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 99.
59. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY (1985); TASK FORCE ON ORGAN
TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 56, at 44.
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Task Force contends that life-saving procedures that are comparable in both
efficacy and cost to other procedures that are routinely covered should qual-
ify. The need for heart and liver transplants is evident; many patients die in
a short time without them. And heart and liver transplants result in signifi-
cant increases in quantity and quality of life. Thus, there is continuity be-
tween heart and liver transplants and other forms of health care that are
recognized to be part of the decent minimum or adequate level of health care
that the society is obligated to provide. Concerns about the costs of health
care are legitimate, but the Task Force believes that the burden of saving
public health funds should be distributed equitably, rather than imposed on
particular groups of patients, such as those suffering from end-stage heart or
liver failure.
There is a second argument for the federal government's role in guarantee-
ing equitable access to organ transplants, regardless of the patient's ability to
pay. While the first argument focuses on the continuity between extrarenal
organ transplants and other forms of health care that are part of the decent
minimum level, the second argument focuses on the special nature of organ
transplantation, especially the social practice of organ procurement and do-
nation. This argument connects organ procurement and distribution, and it
appeals to what the society does in procuring organs rather than to what the
society should do or already does in distributing other forms of health care,
including renal transplants. As a matter of social practice, involving such
public officials as the President and the Secretary of HHS, efforts to increase
the supply of donated organs are aimed at the poor as well as at the rich. All
segments of society are urged to donate organs. However, it is unfair and
even exploitative for the society to ask people, rich and poor alike, to donate
organs if those organs are then distributed on the basis of ability to pay,
rather than medical need, probability of success, and time on the waiting list.
The system fails to meet the standard of justice or fairness when it solicits
organs from all people for the community at large and then excludes some
people, i.e., those who cannot pay, from access to donated organs. In addi-
tion, such exclusions contribute to distrust and thus reduce the overall sup-
ply of donated organs. Therefore, the Task Force strongly recommended
that the federal government, as a last resort, cover the costs of non-experi-
mental extrarenal transplants for the financially needy who have no other
sources of funds for those transplants. 61
AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SECURING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE vol.
1 (1983).
61. TASK FORCE ON ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, supra note 6, at 99-105.
